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I. INTRODUCTION
After the execution of Washington Goode, a black man sen-
tenced to be hanged for murder in Massachusetts in 1848, the Boston
Herald observed that if a "white man who had money had com-
mitted the same crime, he would not have been executed." ' The
same can and has been said with regard to many executions which
* Director, Southern Prisoners' Defense Committee, Atlanta, Georgia; J.D., University of
Kentucky, 1974. B.A., University of Kentucky, 1971. This article draws on the author's experience
in capital litigation for the last eleven years and the materials and testimony received as a member
of the American Bar Association Task Force on Review of State Capital Cases. The Task Force
conducted a study in 1989 of the death penalty review process and made recommendations which,
after modification by the Criminal Justice Section of the ABA, were adopted by the ABA House of
Delegates in February, 1990.
1. L. MASUR, RITEs OF EX EcuTION: CAPrrAL PuNismsNT AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMER-
ICAN CULTuRE, 1776-1865 at 15 (1989).
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occur today. A United States Supreme Court law clerk observed
after a year of reviewing petitions in capital cases that "[w]hether
somebody received the death penalty very often seemed to be a func-
tion of the lawyers .... [T]he death penalty frequently results from
nothing more than poverty and poor lawyering.
' '2
Poor people accused of capital crimes are frequently represented
by inadequately compensated, 3 inexperienced, 4 and incompetent5
court-appointed attorneys. Poverty and poor lawyering may result
in a less than vigorous defense at a trial where the death penalty
2. Sloan, High Court's Handling of Death Cases, Fulton County Daily Report, Mar. 25, 1987,
at 2, col. 1. Race also continues to be a prominent factor in determining who dies. See McCleskey
v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 286-87 (1987); id. at 325-34 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 353-61 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting); Baldus, Pulaski & Woodworth, Arbitrariness and Discrimination in the Administration
of the Death Penalty: A Challenge to State Supreme Courts, 15 SrarsoN L. Rnv. 133 (1986); Gross
& Mauro, Patterns of Death: An Analysis of Racial Disparities in Capital Sentencing and Homicide
Victimization, 37 STAN. L. REV. 27 (1984); Radelet & Pierce, Race and Prosecutorial Discretion in
Homicide Cases, 19 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 587 (1985).
3. Some states pay as little as $1,000 to $2,500 for representation in capital cases. Gradess,
The Road from Scottsboro, Cam. JusT., Summer 1987, at 2, 46. See also, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-
12-21(d) (Supp. 1989) ($1,000 limit on attorney compensation for out-of-court work; no limit on in-
court work); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 16-92-108(b)(2) (1987) (limit of $1,000 on all attorney work); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 99-15-17 (Supp. 1989) (limit of $1,000 per attorney, in capital cases (two attorney
maximum)).
In most capital cases, such low rates amount to less than the minimum wage. For example,
in one Mississippi case the hourly rate for the two lawyers who defended a death penalty case and
were limited to $1,000 amounted to $2.98 and $2.56. Brief for Appellant at 11-12, State v. Wilson,
Nos. 89-301, 89-302 (Miss. 1989). When overhead expenses were figured in, the attorneys lost over
$20 per hour for their work on the case. Id. at 12 n.5.
4. See, e.g., Bell v. Watkins, 692 F.2d 999, 1008 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding that representation
by an attorney who had recently graduated from law school and never tried a criminal case all the
way to verdict does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 843 (1983);
State v. Leatherwood, No. DP-70 (Miss. 1986) (trial transcript) (defendant represented by a public
defender and a third year law student, the latter of whom examined half the witnesses), rev'd on
other grounds, 548 So. 2d 389 (Miss. 1989); Tyler v. Kemp, 755 F.2d 741, 743-44 (1 1th Cir.) (upholding
the lower court's finding that the defendant's attorney, admitted to the bar just a few months before
trial, "was ineffective for failure to present mitigating evidence at the sentencing phase"), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 1026 (1985).
5. See American Bar Association Task Force on Review of State Capital Cases, Toward a
Most Just and Effective System of Review in State Death Penalty Cases, ch. 2 (October 1989) (detailing
instances of incompetent representation and concluding that the inadequacy of counsel is one of "the
principal failings of the capital punishment process today"); Tabak, The Death of Fairness: The
Arbitrary and Capricious Imposition of the Death Penalty in the 1980s, 14 N.Y.U. Rv. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 797, 803-10 (1986) (detailing instances of inadequate representation); Wicker, Defending the
Indigent in Capital Cases, 3 Crim. Just. Ethics 2 (1983) (observing a pattern of incompetent rep-
resentation in capital cases).
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is imposed. 6 It may also mean less than full federal habeas corpus
review. 7 Failure of counsel to recognize a constitutional violation
and properly preserve the issue may be deemed a waiver by the
indigent defendant and a death sentence obtained in violation of the
United States Constitution may be carried out.8
Such a result, particularly in capital cases, seems at war with
this nation's commitment to equal justice9 and the guarantees of the
Bill of Rights.' 0 One would reasonably expect that before a state
executes one of its citizens, it establish that the process by which
the conviction and death sentence were obtained satisfies constitu-
6. See, e.g., Messer v. Kemp, 760 F.2d 1080, 1093-1097 (lth Cir. 1985) (Johnson, J., dis-
senting), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1088, 1088-91 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (at guilt phase, counsel
gave no opening statement, presented no defense case, conducted cursory cross-examination, made
no objections, then emphasized horror of crime in brief closing; at penalty phase, counsel failed to
put on steady employment record, military record, church attendance, and cooperation with police,
and in closing "repeatedly hinted that death was the most appropriate punishment"). Even though
Messer's mental state was the only issue at both the guilt and penalty phases, he was denied a mental
health expert because counsel failed to make an adequate showing that one was needed for the defense
case. Messer v. Kemp, 831 F.2d 946, 954 (11th Cir. 1987) (en banc).
See also Mitchell v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 1026, 1026-32 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial
of certiorari) (attorney made no attempt to contact any mitigating witnesses, made no inquiries into
client's academic, medical, or psychological history, and thus failed to present case in mitigation);
Aldrich v. Wainwright, 777 F.2d 630, 642-44 (11th Cir. 1985) (Johnson, J., dissenting) (counsel was
"totally unprepared" and unable to cross-examine effectively or present evidence that would have
supported the client's alibi defense), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 918 (1986); Alvord v. Wainwright, 469
U.S. 956, 956-63 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari) (counsel conducted
no investigation into client's mental illness even though he had previously been found not guilty by
reason of insanity); Romero v. Lynaugh, 884 F.2d 871, 875 (5th Cir. 1989) (counsel's entire closing
argument, after thanking jury for its attention and asking client to stand, was "[y]ou are an extremely
intelligent jury. You've got that man's life in your hands. You can take it or not. That's all I have
to say.") The death sentence was upheld in all of these cases. Messer and Mitchell have been executed.
7. Federal habeas corpus review, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1982), is now well established
as one of the "avenues of review so long and so well established that they must be counted among
the basic 'protections' with which our system has 'surrounded' all persons convicted of crime." Shaw
v. Martin, 613 F.2d 487, 491 (4th Cir. 1980) (quoting Evans v. Bennett, 440 U.S. 1301, 1303 (1979)).
See also J. LmBm N, FEDERAL HABmns CORPUS PRAC CE AND PROCEDURE 21-24 (1988).
8. See infra notes 16-18, 29-40 and accompanying text; Liebman, supra n.7, at 350-362; Foley,
The New Arbitrariness: Procedural Default of Federal Habeas Corpus Claims in Capital Cases, 23
Loy. L.A. L. Riv. 193, 200-204 (1989).
9. "There can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount
of money he has." Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956).
10. U.S. CoNsT. amends. I-X. The procedural guarantees of the fourth, fifth, sixth and eighth
amendments, made applicable to the states by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment,
apply in capital cases. See, e.g., Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981) (applying principles of fifth
and sixth amendment); Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 501-502 (1987) (summarizing some of the
eighth amendment principles applicable to capital trials).
1990]
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tional standards. 1 Where a life is at stake, the state should not
attempt to dodge this inquiry; it should meet it head on and establish
that justice was done.
In practice, however, states successfully avoid the inquiry in one
capital case after another. It has become evident that the courts in
many areas, particularly in the South, where most of the executions
in this country have taken place, 12 cannot provide capital trials that
comport with the United States Constitution.' 3 Officials in those
states make no secret of the fact that they cannot carry out exe-
cutions without the strict enforcement of procedural bars to prevent
review of constitutional errors by the federal courts 4
Quite often, states are successful in avoiding federal review of
constitutional violations. Under the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Wainwright v. Sykes,' 6 meritorious constitutional claims
11. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 402 (1963) ("in a civilized society, government must always
be accountable to the judiciary" for a defendant's sentence; "if the [sentence] cannot be shown to
conform with the fundamental requirements of law, the individual is entitled to [relief]."). See also
Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 637-38 (1980) (" 'It is of vital importance to the defendant and to
the community that any decision to impose the death sentence be, and appear to be, based on reason
rather than caprice or emotion.' " (quoting Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977)).
12. Ninety percent of the 120 executions between the resumption of the capital punishment in
the 1970's and December 31, 1989, were carried out in the states of the old Confederacy: Texas (33
executions), Florida (21), Louisiana (18), Georgia (14), Virginia (8), Alabama (7), Mississippi (4),
North Carolina (3), and South Carolina (2). NAACP Legal Defense Fund, Execution Update, January
18, 1990.
13. By this author's count, the federal courts had reviewed 85 capital cases from Georgia from
1976 to the end of 1989, and found constitutional violations which resulted in either the conviction
or sentence being set aside in 58 of them (68.2 percent). Constitutional violations also occurred in
some of the cases where relief was denied, but the issue was found to be waived by defense counsel.
See infra notes 29-38 and accompanying text.
14. See, e.g., Evans v. State, 441 So. 2d 520, 531 (Miss. 1983) (Robertson, J., dissenting)
(indicating that the Attorney General of Mississippi had recently begun asking the Mississippi Supreme
Court to invoke procedural bars as a means of preventing federal review following judicial findings
of constitutional violations in seven of the eight Mississippi capital cases reviewed by the federal
courts), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1264 (1984). See also Wheat v. Thigpen, 793 F.2d 621, 626 n.5 (5th
Cir. 1986) (noting that vindication of constitutional rights in the federal courts has been described
by the Mississippi Attorney General as "a '[c]rash [u]pon the [riocky [s]hores of the [flederal
[jiudiciary.' " (quoting State's Response, Edwards v. Thigpen, 433 So. 2d 906 (Miss. 1983)), cert.
denied, 480 U.S. 930 (1987); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-14-42 (Supp. 1989) (amending the post-conviction
review statute in 1982 to erect a new procedural bar to review of claims after a number of death
sentences had been set aside by the federal courts).
15. See infra notes 29-40 and accompanying text.
16. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
4
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may be barred from federal review because of an attorney's failure
to satisfy state procedural rules 7 or the attorney's failure to antic-
ipate changes in the law. 8 Although counsel's failure to preserve
the constitutional violation may be the result of negligence, igno-
rance, or incompetence, it may still pass constitutional muster under
the effective assistance of counsel standard adopted by the Court
in Strickland v. Washington. 9 This standard has been interpreted
by some courts as "not requir[ing] that the accused, even in a capital
case, be represented by able or effective counsel.' '20
The lax standard of Strickland v. Washington and the strict pro-
cedural requirements of Sykes have become the gateposts on the
road to legal condemnation. Between them pass "people of marginal
intelligence, doubtful sanity, and debilitating poverty ' 21 who usually
have no voice in the selection of their counsel2 and are unable to
assert any control over the litigation process. Together Strickland
and Sykes have fostered a substandard level of representation for
the poor and arbitrary and inequitable results in the infliction of
the death penalty.
Whether states will ever establish and adequately fund indigent
defense programs to remedy the deficiencies of counsel remains to
17. Id. at 84-87.
18. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 130-34 (1982) (applying Sykes). See also Smith v. Murray,
477 U.S. 527, 533-36 (1986). But cf. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 13-16 (1984) (where there is "no
reasonable basis in existing law" to assert the claim, a procedural default will be excused).
19. 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under Strick-
land, a defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient under a standard of "prevailing
professional norms," overcome a strong presumption of competency, and establish a reasonable prob-
ability that counsel's errors affected the outcome. Id. at 687-88, 696.
20. Riles v. McCotter, 799 F.2d 947, 955 (5th Cir. 1986) (Rubin, J., concurring).
21. Teepen, Killing in the Name of the Law, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Sept. 5, 1987, page 17A.
See also Lewis, Pincus, Feldman, Jackson & Bard, Psychiatric, Neurological, and Psychoeducational
Characteristics of 15 Death Row Inmates in the United States, 143 Am. J. PsYcmr Ty No. 7, at 838
(July 1986) (finding high incidence of psychiatric, neurological and cognitive disorders among those
condemned to die); Reid, Low IQ Is a Capital Crime, Tan PRooussiv, April 1988, at 24 (describing
mental retardation and other disabilities of several persons sentenced to death).
22. An indigent defendant has no right to select the attorney who defends him. See, e.g., United
States v. Hampton, 457 F.2d 299, 301 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 856 (1972); Tibbett v. Hand,
294 F.2d 68, 73 (10th Cir. 1961); Preston v. State, 257 Ga. 42, 44, 354 S.E.2d 135, 139 (1987);
Drumgo v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. 3d 930, 934-35, 506 P.2d 1007, 1009, 106 Cal. Rptr. 631, 633,
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 979 (1973).
1990]
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be seen.23 This article will focus on the inequities in capital pun-
ishment cases wrought by Sykes where defendants are not adequately
represented. It will demonstrate that invocation of procedural bars
based on defaults that were the result of ignorance, neglect or in-
competence by defense counsel have no place in the review of cases
involving the taking of life.2
II. DECIDING WHO DIEs: A PRINCIPLED SELECTION PROCESS OR
THE LUCK OF THE DiAw?
The judicial process for selecting "the few cases in which [the
death penalty is imposed] from the many cases in which it is not ' 25
is supposed to be a principled one, in which those most deserving
of death are identified based upon the circumstances of the crime
and the background of the offender.26 The United States Supreme
Court has repeatedly held that the eighth amendment prohibits the
arbitrary or capricious imposition of the death penalty.27 In theory,
at least, death is reserved for those who have committed the most
heinous murders and are so far beyond redemption that they should
be eliminated from the human community.
23. The prospects are not encouraging. See Bright, Kinnard & Webster, Keeping Gideon from
Being Blown Away, CuRm. JUST., Winter 1990, at 10; Bizzaro, Funding Crunch Is Eroding Rights
Won In Gideon, FLORmA BAR NEws, May 15, 1989, at 8.
24. At the time of this writing, there were several proposals before the Congress that would
either improve or worsen the situation. Several proposals would adopt for the first time a statute of
limitations for habeas corpus petitions. See, e.g., S.1757, 101st Cong., Ist Sess., 135 CoNo. REc.
S13474 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 1989); S.1760, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CoNo. REc. S13480 (daily ed.
Oct. 16, 1989). These provisions, if adopted, could result in the ultimate procedural default: the
barring of any federal review because the lawyer for the petitioner did not file the papers on time.
On the other hand, another proposal would allow federal courts to consider constitutional claims
where the failure to preserve them was attributable to the ignorance or neglect of the attorney. See
S.1757, supra, at S13475.
25. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 427 (1980) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,
188 (1976)).
26. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) ("[T]he fundamental respect
for humanity underlying the Eight Amendment ... requires consideration of the character and record
of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally in-
dispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death."). See also Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153, 197 (1976) (Georgia statutory procedures "require the jury to consider the circumstances
of the crime and the criminal before it recommends sentence"); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104,
112 (1982) ("the sentencer in capital cases must be permitted to consider any relevant mitigating
factor").
27. See, e.g., Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 508-09 (1987); Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S.
625, 640 (1980); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189.
[Vol. 92
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In practice, however, the system for imposing capital punishment
is most often a game of chance in which the winners and the losers
are distinguished not by their criminal and moral culpability, but
by the luck of the lawyers they draw. 28 This is illustrated by the
cases of Smith29 and Machetti, 30 two codefendants sentenced to death
at separate trials by unconstitutionally composed juries within a few
weeks of each other in the same county in Georgia. 1 Machetti's
lawyers challenged the jury composition in state court; Smith's law-
yers did not because they were unaware of a United States Supreme
Court decision decided only five days before Smith's trial began. 2
A new trial was ordered for Machetti by the Eleventh Circuit Court
of Appeals,3 3 and, at that trial, a jury which fairly represented the
community imposed a sentence of life imprisonment. The Eleventh
Circuit refused to consider the identical issue in Smith's case because
his lawyers did not preserve itA4 Smith was executed, becoming the
first person to die under the Georgia statute previously held con-
stitutional in Gregg v. Georgia.5
If Machetti had been represented by Smith's lawyers and vice
versa in state court, Machetti would have been executed and Smith
would have obtained federal habeas corpus relief. This is not how
a principled selection process should work. Yet Smith is hardly an
isolated example. The second person executed in Georgia was a men-
tally retarded offender, who was denied relief despite a jury in-
28. Other arbitrary factors, such as race, the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, exclusion of
segments of the community from jury service, political influences, and the quality and availability
of counsel at all stages of the process, continue to play a significant role in determining who dies.
See supra n.2 and accompanying text; B. NAxau. & K. HARY, TnE AgR~smAanss OF Tn DEATH
PENALTY (1987); Tabak & Lane, The Execution of Injustice: A Cost and Lack-of-Benefit Analysis
of the Death Penalty, 23 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 59, 62-89 (1989); Bentele, The Death Penalty in Georgia:
Still Arbitrary, 62 WAsH. U.L.Q. 573 (1985).
29. Smith v Kemp, 715 F.2d 1459 (11th Cir. 1983), application for stay denied, 463 U.S. 1344,
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1003 (1983).
30. Machetti v. Linaham, 679 F.2d 236 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1127 (1983).
31. Id. at 237-38. Women were systematically excluded from the jury pools from which Mach-
etti's and Smith's juries were selected. See id. at 238-42.
32. Smith's trial lawyers disclosed in their application for clemency that they were unaware of
Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975). Application of Smith, Ga. Board of Pardons and Paroles,
at 33 (Dec. 6, 1983).
33. Machetti, 679 F.2d at 241-42.
34. Smith v. Kemp, 715 F.2d at 1476 (Hatchett, J., dissenting).
35. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
1990]
7
B.: Death by Lottery--Procedural Bar of Constitutional Claims in Capi
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1990
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
struction which unconstitutionally shifted the burden of proof on
intent 6 because his attorney did not preserve the issue by raising an
objection at trial.37 His more culpable codefendant was granted a
new trial on the unconstitutional instruction. 8 Again, a switch of
the lawyers would have reversed the outcomes of the two cases.
Many other executions have been carried out after courts refused
to examine constitutional questions because of counsel's failure to
preserve them. Two executions occurred after decisions by the United
States Supreme Court that meritorious constitutional claims were
barred because trial or appellate lawyers failed to recognize or pre-
serve the issues.3 9 Many others have been carried out after federal
courts refused to address the merits of issues because of procedural
bars invoked by the state under Sykes. 40
36. See Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 315-25 (1985); Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S.
510, 514-19 (1979).
37. Stanley v. Kemp, 737 F.2d 921, 922 (11th Cir.) (per curiam), application for stay denied,
468 U.S. 1220 (1984).
38. Thomas v. Kemp, 800 F.2d 1024 (l1th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987).
39. In Dugger v. Adams, 109 S. Ct. 1211 (1989), the Court held that relief was barred because
the trial lawyer did not object to jury instructions which unconstitutionally reduced the jury's sense
of responsibility for its decision. A panel of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit had
unanimously concluded that Adams had been unconstitutionally sentenced to death because of those
instructions. Adams v. Wainwright, 804 F.2d 1526 (lth Cir. 1986), modified sub. nom, Adams v.
Dugger, 816 F.2d 1493 (lth Cir. 1987). Adams was executed by Florida on May 4, 1989. In Smith
v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527 (1986), the Court held that review of a claim that psychiatric evidence has
been obtained unlawfully was barred because it had not been properly raised on appeal by Smith
even though it had been raised in an amicus curiae brief. Justice John Paul Stevens noted in dissent
that "[t]he record ... unquestionably demonstrates that petitioner's constitutional claim is merito-
rious, and that there is a significant risk that he will be put to death because his constitutional rights
were violated." Id. at 539. He suggested that "the Court has lost its way in a procedural maze of
its own creation" and "grossly misevaluated the requirements of 'law and justice' that are the federal
court's statutory mission under the federal habeas corpus statute." Id. at 541. Smith was executed
by Virginia on July 31, 1986.
40. It is seldom that a capital case decided by a federal court of appeals does not involve one
or more issues that are procedurally barred. See, e.g., Richardson v. Johnson, 864 F.2d 1536 (lth
Cir. 1989) (three of five issues in Alabama capital case barred from consideration), cert. denied, 109
S. Ct. 3175 (1989); Julius v. Johnson, 840 F.2d 1533, 1545-47 (lth Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S.
Ct. 404 (1988); Whitley v. Bair, 802 F.2d 1487, 1496 n.17 (4th Cir. 1986) (all 15 issues in Virginia
capital case barred from consideration), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 951 (1987); Dobbert v. Strickland,
718 F.2d 1518, 1524-25 (11th Cir. 1983) (issue of exclusion of jurors barred), cert. denied, 109 S.
Ct. 1353 (1989); O'Bryan v. Estelle, 714 F.2d 365, 384-85 (5th Cir. 1983) (failure to given instruction
on mitigating circumstances, later held to be a constitutional violation in Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S.
Ct. 2934 (1989), barred), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1013 (1984); Antone v. Strickland, 706 F.2d 1534
(11th Cir.) (review of instruction limiting the jury's consideration of mitigating evidence barred), cert.
[Vol. 92
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III. THE GULF BETWEEN THE QUALITY OF COUNSEL REQUIRED By
SYKEs AND THAT TOLERATED UNDER STRICKAND
The United States Supreme Court held in Wainwright v. Sykes"
that failure of defense counsel to comply with a contemporaneous
objection rule at trial precluded federal habeas corpus review of a
constitutional claim. Prior to Sykes, a defendant's failure to preserve
a constitutional claim in the state courts would not prevent review
in federal court so long as the prisoner had not deliberately bypassed
the state procedures.42
Cases decided after Sykes have established virtually impossible
requirements that defense counsel must be errorless and capable of
anticipating changes in the law. A mistake or negligence on the part
of counsel does not excuse a default. 43 Ignorance on the part of
counsel of an emerging constitutional theory that is being litigated
in other jurisdictions is no excuse for failing to raise an issue. 44 And
failure to raise and preserve an issue that is completely without merit
under existing case law will bar relief if the right is later recognized. 45
For an attorney to provide the representation anticipated by Sykes
and subsequent cases, he or she must be completely conversant with
federal constitutional decisions of the state and federal courts
throughout the nation. The lawyer also must keep abreast of de-
denied, 464 U.S. 1003 (1983); Bass v. Estelle, 696 F.2d 1154 (5th Cir.) (issue of improper exclusion
of juror barred), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 865 (1983); Sullivan v. Wainwright, 695 F.2d 1306 (11th Cir.
1983) (three of five issues barred), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 922 (1983). The petitioners in all of these
cases have been executed. NAACP Legal Defense Fund, EXECUTION UPDATE, January 18, 1990 at 2-
5. It is impossible to determine the number of issues that are not presented to the federal habeas
corpus courts because it is clear that consideration will be barred due to procedural defaults.
41. 433 U.S. 72, 84-87 (1977). The Court held that a defaulted claim could be entertained by
the federal court only if the habeas corpus petitioner could show cause for not complying with the
state procedural rule and actual prejudice resulting therefrom.
42. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963). In determining "deliberate bypass," the Court employed
the "intentional relinquishment of a known right or privilege" analysis of Johnson v. Zerbst, 304
U.S. 458, 464 (1938), and concluded that Noia in failing to present his claim on appeal to the state
codrts had not done it as a "tactical or strategic litigation step, or in ... deliberate circumvention
of state procedures." Fay, 372 U.S. at 440.
43. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986).
44. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107 (1982).
45. Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527 (1986).
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velopments in all of the federal circuits, the state appellate courts46
and the writings of commentators. This is necessary so that counsel
will be aware of all issues that are "percolating" 47 in those courts,
recognize the "tools to construct [the] constitutional claim" 48 and
then raise and present all issues long before they achieve general
acceptance in the courts.
Moreover, the lawyer must be aware of the necessity of raising
all of the these "percolating" issues even though they may be fore-
closed by existing case law of the state and federal courts that have
jurisdiction over the case. Otherwise, if the law changes due to a
new United States Supreme Court decision, the defendant will be
barred from obtaining relief because of his failure to assert an ob-
jection when it was meritless. 4
9
Unfortunately, the poor person accused of a capital crime is
seldom, if ever, defended by a constitutional scholar possessing this
extraordinary depth and range of knowledge of constitutional law. 0
46. See, e.g., Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 25 (1984) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist
would have denied Ross relief for not raising an issue at his North Carolina trial in March, 1969,
based on "the reasoning employed" by a lower Connecticut court and the Eighth Circuit in two cases
decided in June and November of 1968. Id. See also Engle, 456 U.S. at 107, 132 n.40 (1982) (refusing
to excuse counsel's failure to raise new claim because it had been litigated in some state and federal
courts).
47. Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. at 537.
48. Engle, 456 U.S. at 133. The Court in Engle stated that "[e]ven those decisions rejecting
the defendant's claim, of course, show that the issue had been perceived by other defendants and
that it was a live one in the courts at the time." Id. at 133 n.41. Thus, defense counsel must be
aware of the losing issues being litigated in other jurisdictions in order to protect their clients' rights.
49. In Smith v. Murray, counsel did not challenge on direct appeal to the state supreme court
the admission of testimony by a psychiatrist about his interview with the defendant as a violation of
the privilege against self-incrimination and the right to counsel because it was foreclosed by previous
decisions of that court. 477 U.S. at 531. Thereafter, the Supreme Court sustained such a challenge
in Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981). However, the Court held that review of the issue was barred
in Smith v. Murray because of counsel's failure to raise the issue on direct appeal. Notwithstanding
the Court's statement that the "process of 'winnowing out weaker arguments on appeal and focusing
on' those more likely to prevail ... is the hallmark of effective appellate advocacy," Smith, 477
U.S. at 536 (quoting Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751-52 (1983)), the unmistakable lesson of Smith
v. Murray is that there is no longer any such thing as a frivolous issue. Every issue must be raised
in a capital case, no matter how hopeless at the time. Winnowing out weaker arguments can have,
as it did in Smith, fatal consequences.
50. The Mississippi Supreme Court has observed that although "death penalty litigation has
become highly specialized ... few attorneys [in Mississippi] have 'even a surface familiarity with
seemingly innumerable refinements put on [the U.S. Supreme Court's capital decisions]. .. ' " Irving
v. State, 441 So. 2d 846, 856 (Miss. 1983).
[Vol. 92
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DEATH BY LOTTERY
Many capital cases are defended by small town lawyers who do not
even specialize in criminal law, much less the subspeciality of capital
punishment law. 1
For example, a Georgia lawyer who has defended several capital
cases was asked recently to name any criminal law decisions from
any court with which he was familiar. Besides the case in which he
was testifying, he was able to name only two: "Miranda and Dred
Scott."152 Last year Alabama executed one person whose lawyer filed
no appellate brief with the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals after
the death sentence was imposed on a remand. 3
Yet lawyers with such limited knowledge of the law often satisfy
the Strickland standard of minimally effective representation. The
United States Supreme Court has held that "the Constitution ...
does not insure that defense counsel will recognize and raise every
conceivable constitutional claim." 54 The Georgia defense lawyer
whose entire knowledge of "criminal law" is "Miranda" and "Dred
Scott" has twice been held to satisfy the Strickland standard.5 As
Justice Thurgood Marshall has pointed out, "all manner of negli-
gence, ineptitude, and even callous disregard for the client" passes
51. The appointment of individual private attorneys to cases from a list of available attorneys
is the method of providing counsel in 69 percent of the counties in the South. Bureau of Justice
Statistics, United States Department of Justice, CiwnAL DEFENSE FOR THE POOR, 1986 at 3 (Sept.
1988). Many of the states that impose the death penalty most frequently-Alabama, Georgia, Mis-
sissippi, Louisiana, and Texas-have no state-wide indigent defense system. See, e.g., Bright, Kinnard
& Webster, Keeping Gideon from Being Blown Away, Criam. JusT., Winter, 1990, at 10, 12 (describing
the "hodgepodge of approaches to representation of indigent defendants in Georgia"); SPANZENBERG
GROUP, ANALYSIS OF COST OF COURT-APPOINTED COUNSEL IN VIRGINIA (1985).
52. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393
(1856). Of course, Dred Scott was not a criminal case.
53. Richardson v. State, No. 4 Div. 624 Docket Entries (Ala. Crim. App., Oct. 3, 1978).
Richardson was executed August 18, 1989. Richardson's lawyer was later disbarred.
54. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134 (1982).
55. Williams v. State, 368 S.E.2d 742, 747-750 (Ga. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3261 (1989);
Birt v. Montgomery, 725 F.2d 587 (1lth Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 874 (1984). In Birt,
the dissent would have found the attorney ineffective for failing to investigate and challenge jury
pools that were unconstitutionally composed. Birt, 725 F.2d at 603-05 (Hatchett, J., dissenting). How-
ever, because the majority concluded that he was not ineffective, Birt's conviction was upheld even
though the jury which convicted him was drawn from a jury pool in which black people and women
were systematically excluded. Id. at 596-601.
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constitutional muster under the Strickland standard.56 Nevertheless,
a majority of the Supreme Court has decided that "[s]o long as a
defendant is represented by counsel whose performance is not con-
stitutionally ineffective under the standard established in Strickland
v. Washington ... we discern no inequity in requiring him to bear
the risk of attorney error that results in a procedural default." 57
This is a remarkable statement. Surely there is some inequity in
penalizing impoverished people for the ignorance, neglect and mis-
takes of lawyers they had no involvement in selecting. When the
penalty is to allow an unconstitutionally obtained death sentence to
be carried out, the inequity becomes even more apparent.
IV. Titm UNCONSCIONABLE IMPACT OF SYKES ON THE POOR IN
CAPITAL CASES CANNOT BE JUSTIFIED
While it may be appropriate in some types of litigation for lit-
igants to suffer the consequences of mistakes made by their chosen
counsel 5 8 it is not acceptable in a process of deciding the life and
death of poor people who had no involvement in the selection of
their lawyers or in the failures of those lawyers to discharge their
responsibilities.
Poor people charged with capital offenses in Alabama, Georgia,
Mississippi, Texas and elsewhere usually have no alternative except
to be represented by attorneys who lack the skill, knowledge, re-
sources, financial incentive and willingness to protect their rights
56. Remarks of Justice Thurgood Marshall to the Second Circuit Judicial Conference, Sept.
1988. In an earlier address to the Second Circuit Conference, Justice Marshall stated: "Often trial
counsel simply are unfamiliar with the special rules that apply in capital cases .... For example, I
have read cases in which counsel was unaware that certain death penalty issues were pending before
the appellate courts and that the claims should be preserved .... ." Marshall, Remarks on the Death
Penalty Made at the Judicial Conference of the Second Circuit, 86 CoLuM. L. REv. 1, 1-2 (1986).
A brief filed recently in the Georgia Supreme Court asserted that the "stable of attorneys used in
death penalty cases [in one Georgia judicial circuit] would be rejected by even a decent glue factory."
Woolner, Capital Counsel Must Be Paid, Fulton County Daily Report, Feb. 23, 1990, at 6, 7 (quoting
from brief in Birt v. State, Ga. S. Ct. No. $89A0068).
57. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986).
58. See, e.g., Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 633-34 (1962) (dismissal for counsel's
absence from hearing and failure to prosecute upheld because civil litigant "voluntarily chose this
attorney as his representative ... and he cannot now avoid the consequences of the acts or omissions
of this freely selected agent.").
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adequately. They have no remedy for the negligent or ignorant fail-
ure of their lawyers to protect their rights. On the way to the ex-
ecutioner, one has little chance of bringing a successful malpractice
action59 against the attorney who denied him his day in court by
waiving a constitutional issue. Even if such an action were to suc-
ceed, the monetary recovery would be of little solace to the con-
demned as the executioner went about his grisly business.
Requiring these defendants to pay with their lives for the ig-
norance or neglect of their attorneys is simply too harsh, too in-
equitable and altogether inconsistent with the notion of a principled
process of selecting those deserving of death based on their crime
and background.
A. The Rationale For Sykes Is at Odds with the Reality of
Representation of the Poor in Capital Cases
The majority in Sykes concluded that its procedural default rule
would encourage the presentation of constitutional claims at the state
criminal trial, thereby resulting in a trial "as free of error as pos-
sible." 6 This assumes a defense counsel who is aware of the con-
stitutional claim and is capable of preserving it. Where this critical
ingredient to the adversary process is missing, an onerous procedural
bar does nothing to remove a constitutional-deficiency from the trial;
it simply sweeps it under the rug.
Sykes does not encourage the states to provide competent coun-
sel. Instead, Sykes and Strickland reward them for providing in-
adequate counsel. The state obtains two benefits from the poor
representation the defendant receives: the likelihood of obtaining the
death sentence is increased61 and any constitutional deficiencies that
59. In other types of litigation, "if an attorney's conduct falls substantially below what is
reasonable under the circumstances, the client's remedy is against the attorney in a suit for mal-
practice." Link v. NWabash R. Co., 370 U.S. at 633 n.10.
60. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90 (1977).
61. "[A]ccused persons who are represented by 'not legally ineffective' lawyers may be con-
demned to die when the same accused, if represented by effective counsel, would receive at least the
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occur in the process may be insulated from review. 62 Ironically, the
result of Sykes and Strickland is that, so long as counsel is not so
bad as to fall below the Strickland standard, the poorest level of
representation at trial receives the least scrutiny in post-conviction
review.
Sykes overlooks which side controls the selection of counsel in
cases of indigent defendants. Its rationale may apply in the case of
knowledgeable, sophisticated defendants who can afford to hire their
own lawyers to protect their rights.6 3 However, the poor person ac-
cused of a crime does not select his attorney; one is appointed for
him. A local community, outraged over the murder of one of its
members, usually has no incentive to protect the constitutional rights
of the one accused of the killing. 64 Often court-appointed counsel
do not welcome the assignment65 or empathize with the plight of
62. In states which do not provide adequate counsel, it is not unusual for the state to argue
that most, if not all, issues are precluded because defense counsel did not preserve them. See, e.g.,
the cases cited, supra note 40.
63. Even a lawyer specializing in the defense of criminal cases cannot reasonably be expected
to have the breadth of knowledge required by Sykes. See supra notes 43-48 and accompanying text.
The busy trial lawyer, whose time is spent primarily interviewing clients and witnesses, preparing for
trial, and trying cases cannot possibly keep up with all of the issues that are being litigated in all
the state and federal courts throughout the land.
64. Appointment of counsel is usually made in the southern states by an elected judge who
must be sensitive to the desires of his constituency to remain in office or advance to higher office.
This may explain why a defendant in a capital trial in Mississippi was defended by a third-year law
student who requested a moment to compose herself during trial because she had never been in court
before, State v. Leatherwood, 548 So. 2d 389 (Miss. 1989); or a defendant in a Georgia capital trial
was represented by an attorney who had been admitted to the bar just a few months before trial,
Tyler v. Kemp, 755 F.2d 741, 743 (1985); or an Alabama trial was allowed to proceed even after
the defense lawyer had been found intoxicated and sent to jail for a night during trial, Haney v.
State, Record on Appeal at R846-49, Ala. Crim. App. No. 7 Div. 148 (1989); or a trial court in
Georgia attempted, prior to the retrial of a capital case that had been reversed by the Supreme Court,
Amadeo v. Zant, 486 U.S. 214 (1988), to replace two experienced lawyers who had won the new trial
for the defendant with two lawyers who had no capital punishment experience. Amadeo v. State, 259
Ga. 469, 384 S.E.2d 181 (1989).
65. See, e.g., Coleman v. Kemp, 778 F.2d 1487, 1494-95, 1503, 1516, 1522 (11th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1164 (1986). There, the Court of Appeals described how all eight lawyers
appointed to represent four persons facing the death penalty in a small, rural Georgia community
publically made known their objections to the appointments. One attorney was quoted in the local
newspaper as saying the appointment was "the worst thing that's ever happened to me professionally."
Id. at 1503. Another said it would mean "the loss of money and friends." Id. at 1504. Another was
quoted in the newspaper as saying about his appointment: "I despise it; I'd rather take a whipping
.. It's worse than taking a dose of Colomel [a laxative] but I have to take it. To refuse would be
contempt of court." Id. at 1522.
[Vol. 92
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their clients. 66 Counsel may have greater loyalty to the community
from where future business will come than to the defendant he is
appointed to represent.67 Not infrequently, these court-appointed
lawyers are less than zealous in their representation and do not serve
the interests of their clients.68
The strict procedural default rule adopted in Sykes also rests
upon the Court's undocumented fear of "sandbagging"-the with-
holding of meritorious claims by lawyers who somehow know that
an appellate court will surely sustain them on appeal. However, the
dismal history of representation by court-appointed attorneys in cap-
ital cases indicates that most of them lack the sophistication required
to "sandbag." 69 An attorney whose total knowledge of criminal law
66. See, e.g., Dobbs v. Zant, 720 F. Supp. 1566 (N.D. Ga. 1989). The defendant, a black man,
was represented by a white defense attorney whose attitudes were described as follows by the District
Court:
Dobb's trial attorney was outspoken about his views. He said that many blacks are un-
educated and would not make good teachers, but do make good basketball players. He
opined that blacks are less educated and less intelligent than whites either because of their
nature or because "my granddaddy had slaves." He said that integration has led to de-
teriorating neighborhoods and schools and referred to the black community in Chattanooga
as "black boy jungle." He strongly implied that blacks have inferior morals by relating a
story about sex in a classroom. He also said that when he was young, a maid was hired
with the understanding that she would steal some items. He said that blacks in Chattanooga
are more troublesome than blacks in Walker County [Georgia]....
Id. at 1577 (denying habeas corpus relief).
67. See, e.g., Goodwin v. Balkcom, 684 F.2d 794, 805-09 (lth Cir. 1982) (fears of negative
public reaction led counsel to tell jury that he was appointed to defend the case and to conduct less
than vigorous defense), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1098 (1983); Barrow v. State, 239 Ga. 162, 163, 236
S.E.2d 257, 259 (1977) (attorney did not challenge underrepresentation of black citizens on grand
jury because he wanted to be rehired as public defender, and "he felt adverse community pressure
would inure to him personally if he attempted to have more blacks placed on the grand jury, and
that he had obligations to other clients whom he did not want to jeopardize by bringing an unpopular
motion").
68. See, e.g., Amadeo v. Zant, 486 U.S. 214 (1988) (court-appointed lawyers gave testimony
that would bar habeas corpus relief for their former client; however, because testimony was not
plausible and inconsistent with counsel's actions at the time of trial it was not credited); Stano v.
Dugger, 883 F.2d 900, 916 (11th Cir. 1989) (defense counsel, who was interested in writing a book
about the defendant if he was a serial killer, instructed the defense psychologist to tell police officer
how best to exploit the defendant's mental disabilities in order to elicit confessions) (rehearing granted
and opinion vacated Oct. 31, 1989); Peek v. Kemp, 784 F.2d 1479, 1540 (lth Cir. 1986), (Johnson,
J., dissenting) (during jury deliberations on guilt, defense counsel stipulated to substitution of a juror
at 12:30 a.m. without any questioning of juror who was replaced or requesting any reinstruction of
jury; three minutes after the substitution, the jury returned a verdict of guilty), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
939 (1986).
69. Twelve years after Sykes, there has yet to be any evidence that attorneys engage in such
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is "Miranda and Dred Scott" is hardly in a position to recognize
and hide many constitutional issues.
But beyond these obvious limitations upon those who defend the
poor in capital trials for as little as $1,000 to $2,500, almost any
lawyer is going to try to prevail in the forum where the case is tried,
not "save" an issue for an uncertain later day in a court whose
composition and receptiveness to the issue cannot possibly be cal-
culated at the time of trial.70
B. The Protections of the Constitution Should Be Enforced In
Capital Cases
Procedural bars based on defaults occurring because of igno-
rance, neglect or incompetence on the part of defense counsel have
no place in the review of cases involving the taking of life. Execution
is an extraordinary and irremediable penalty. If it is to be used at
all, its use should be strictly limited to punishing offenders for their
own conduct, not that of their lawyers. Allowing an unconstitutional
execution to take place because the lawyer blundered makes a proc-
ess that did not meet constitutional standards all the more arbitrary
and inequitable. 71
The Bill of Rights is not a collection of technicalities. It is this
nation's most fundamental guarantees of fairness and justice. For
200 years we have revered these rights. This nation is respected and
emulated throughout the world because we provide these safeguards
of liberty and justice to even the least among us, even those who
have offended us most grievously.
a practice. The ABA Task Force Report, supra n.5 at 168 (Manuscript Ed.), states: "It is our studied
conclusion, based on extensive testimony on this question and our own experience, that capital trial
and appellate lawyers rarely engage in the practice of sandbagging."
70. As Justice Brennan pointed out in his dissent in Sykes, the notion of sandbagging "simply
offends common sense" because it would involve a lawyer withholding a meritorious claim from the
trial court, thereby increasing the likelihood of conviction and forfeiting state review, and then at-
tempting to deceive the federal habeas court by convincing it that he did not "deliberately bypass"
the state procedures at the risk of being barred from federal review. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S.
at 103 n.5 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
71. See Dugger v. Adams, 109 S. Ct. 1211, 1218 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice
Blackmun, joined by three other justices, accused the majority of "arbitrarily impos[ing] procedural
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On the other hand, the procedural default doctrine of Wain-
wright v. Sykes enjoys no such pedigree. It is a collection of tech-
nicalities. It is not the work of Jefferson, Madison, and Henry, but
a thirteen-year-old, judicially created rule which frustrates vindi-
cation of the principles upon which this Republic was founded. While
appearing to operate equally upon all, it falls most heavily upon
the poor, who are usually defended by the inexperienced and the
incompetent. Application of procedural bars, which has been aptly
characterized as "unseemly" efforts to "pull the rug out from un-
der" poor people because of mistakes by their court-appointed law-
yers 7 2 does not serve the interests of justice.
V. CONCLUSION
As Judge Irving L. Goldberg has eloquently pointed out, we are
trading away "the most precious legacy of Lord Coke, the power
to discharge from the custody even one imprisoned by order of the
King," for one mess of pottage after another. 73 Interests of comity,
expediency and finality are increasingly taking precedence over our
most cherished and most fundamental notions of justice and fair-
ness. This trend should be reversed. Ineptness on the part of a lawyer
should not operate to strip away the protections of the Bill of Rights
from the most important and unalterable decision made in our legal
system. Federal courts should decide the merits of constitutional
claims in all but the most exceptional cases, where it is clearly es-
tablished by the state that there was actual withholding of a claim.
Otherwise, the death penalty will too often be punishment not for
committing the worst crime, but for being assigned the worst lawyer.
72. Evans v. State, 441 So. 2d 520, 531 (Miss. 1983) (Robertson, J., dissenting), cert. denied,
467 U.S. 1264 (1984).
73. Galtieri v. Wainwright, 582 F.2d 348, 375 (5th Cir. 1978) (Goldberg, J., dissenting). See
also Bass v. Estelle, 696 F.2d 1154, 1160-62 (5th Cir.) (Goldberg, J., specially concurring), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 865 (1983).
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